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Abstract 
Software protection is of great interest to commercial industry.  Millions of 
dollars and years of research are invested in the development of proprietary algorithms 
used in software programs.  A reverse engineer that successfully reverses another 
company‘s proprietary algorithms can develop a competing product to market in less time 
and with less money.  The threat is even greater in military applications where adversarial 
reversers can use reverse engineering on unprotected military software to compromise 
capabilities on the field or develop their own capabilities with significantly less 
resources.  Thus, it is vital to protect software, especially the software‘s sensitive internal 
algorithms, from adversarial analysis. 
Software protection through obfuscation is a relatively new research initiative.  
The mathematical and security community have yet to agree upon a model to describe the 
problem let alone the metrics used to evaluate the practical solutions proposed by 
computer scientists.  We propose evaluating solutions to obfuscation under the intent 
protection model, a combination of white-box and black-box protection to reflect how 
reverse engineers analyze programs using a combination white-box and black-box 
attacks.  In addition, we explore use of experimental methods and metrics in analogous 
and more mature fields of study such as hardware circuits and cryptography.  Finally, we 
implement a solution under the intent protection model that demonstrates application of 
the methods and evaluation using the metrics adapted from the aforementioned fields of 
study to reflect the unique challenges in a software-only software protection technique. 
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SOFTWARE OBFUSCATION WITH 
SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Information assurance is traditionally comprised of two components: network 
security and operation system integrity.  Software protection is intended to complement 
this traditional viewpoint with an application-centric approach to protect Department of 
Defense (DoD) software critical to national security.  The goal of this research is to 
improve protection of DoD scientific, engineering, and simulation software within their 
normal operating environment while minimizing impact on code performance and 
usability (Hughes and Stytz, 2003).  This research attempts to provide a model and a 
technique for software protection that produces quantifiable protection against reverse-
engineering analysis.  The model and technique address unique difficulties in practical 
implementation of software application protection with a software-only approach.  
Methodology for this research adapts practices in functionally related fields such as data 
cryptography and hardware circuit protection.   
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the efforts of this software protection 
research and will address the background, the investigated problem and the methodology.  
This paper intends to support AFRL‘s Software Protection Initiative (AFRL/SPI) in 
producing techniques that can measurably secure applications through integration with 
critical software. 
 
2 
1.1 Background 
  Reverse engineering is the process by which a fabricated product is deconstructed 
to understand its design, architecture, and underlying technological properties (Eilam, 
2005:xxiv).  Historically, this process was successful in assimilating the technological 
edge of an adversary.  Famous and successful WWII examples include: American and 
British Jerry cans from German gasoline cans, Soviet R-7 rockets from German V2 
rockets, and Soviet Tupolev Tu-4 strategic bomber from American B-29s as seen in 
Figure 1 (―Reverse,‖ 2007; ―B-29,‖ 2007; ―Tupolev,‖ 2007).   
 
Figure 1.  American B-29 (left) and Soviet Tu-4 (right) 
In post-WWII events, the crash of an F-117A in 1999 during the Kosovo conflict 
resulted in the capture of a second-generation stealth platform by the Yugoslavians, who 
subsequently sold parts of the wreckage to the Russians (Richelson, 2001:62).  While no 
official reports indicate that the Russians have made significant use of the wreckage, it is 
conceivable that the exploitation of F-117A technologies from the wreckage could be 
used to advance anti-stealth technologies, or sold to nation-states aspiring to advance 
their own stealth programs (Carlson, 1999).  The crash of an US Navy EP-3 intelligence 
aircraft off the coast of China in 2001 is another often cited example of where military 
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hardware was lost to foreign nation-states.  In this instance, losing the hardware asset was 
potentially less severe than losing the software installed on the platform; CNN reports 
that the airplane‘s most sensitive components were the ―software and encryption devices 
used for unscrambling military codes (―Plane,‖ 2001).‖ 
The old paradigm of software security is relatively weak.  Previously, military 
technology software required computational power available only on high performance 
computing (HPC) assets that were safeguarded by export control laws.  HPC trade 
regulations, therefore, indirectly protected all of the state-of-the-art defense applications.  
However, with the advancement of computer hardware technology, theft of software no 
longer necessitates theft of corresponding hardware (Hughes and Stytz, 2007).  As an 
example, Xiaodong Meng, in 2006, pleaded guilty under espionage charges for exporting 
Quantum3D proprietary software products to China, Thailand, and Malaysia (Department 
of Justice, 2006); the international-trade restricted software products are exclusively used 
to train US military fighter pilots (―U.S. Arms Software,‖ 2007). 
As shown by the Meng incident, traditional information assurance protects the 
data stored on the system and the data travelling on the network, but not the high-valued 
applications that actually generate the data. 
Many research areas credit software for achieving distinct technological 
advancements; investments made by the DoD over the last three decades have yielded 
technological advantages in electromagnetic modeling for radar signature predictions, 
fluid dynamic simulations for aircraft testing, and many other critical fields.  The lack of 
quantifiable software protection mechanisms irresponsibly risks unauthorized 
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exploitation of high value applications and threaten to erode our technological advantage.  
Without safeguards, adversaries can reverse our applications to develop countermeasures 
to our weapons, save on research and development costs, and build more advanced 
weapons (Hughes and Stytz, 2007). 
Thus, in congruence with AFRL/SPI‘s mission statement, software technologies 
critical to national defense must be protected from reverse-engineering (Hughes and 
Stytz, 2007).  The overall goal of this research is to develop an algorithm to protect 
software from reverse-engineering attacks and select metrics and benchmarks to 
quantifiably evaluate the developed algorithms.  We examine the general software 
protection problem, analyze current interpretations and models of the problem, and study 
practical implementations of specific techniques.  It is the intent of this research to 
describe a model that accurately reflects the software protection problem and demonstrate 
the quantifiable security of the proposed protection algorithm under the model using 
benchmark programs. 
1.2 Problem Under Investigation 
AFRL/SPI identifies four main thrust areas for research in long-term application 
security: algorithms, environments, benchmarks and metrics, and integration.  Algorithms 
research addresses the need for techniques that produce protected software.  Software 
environment research focuses on methods to protect software throughout its entire 
development process.  Benchmarks and metrics are necessary so for consistent and 
accurate measurement of the potency and cost of proposed protection techniques.  
Integration research focuses on efficient composition of both multiple application 
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security techniques and application security techniques with operation and network 
security measures (Hughes and Stytz, 2007).  
This research supports two of the four thrusts: developing an algorithm to secure 
software and identifying metrics to stratify potency and cost.  To satisfy these objectives, 
a series of investigative tasks was completed.  First, we studied current software 
protection approaches for their merits and deficiencies, in addition to possible research 
directions based on their results.  Second, we conducted analysis on techniques in fields, 
such as data cryptography and hardware anti-tampering, that share similar concerns 
regarding information protection.  Third, we examined the uniqueness of the software 
operating environment to understand the specific challenges in a software-only solution.  
Furthermore, by understanding the nuances of the software operating environment, we 
can determine what approaches and techniques are feasibly adoptable or adaptable from 
other environments to function within the software environment.  Finally, we test 
applications and evaluate them against developed criteria to examine efficacy of the new 
technique upon implementation.  Applying the algorithm to actual software code creates 
a visual picture on the qualitative effectiveness and practicability of the model. 
In summary, the delineated tasks approach the problem by looking outside the 
software domain, defining the uniqueness of the domain, and translating the techniques to 
work successfully back in the domain.  
1.3 Scope and Methodology 
Software protection is a broad topic covering a vast array of subjects including 
error handling, buffer checking, and mature software engineering.  This research focuses 
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on software protection as a means to prevent reverse-engineering of software algorithms.   
This research intends to describe a model for evaluating software protection, select 
metrics to evaluate security of within the model, develop benchmark programs to test 
against the model and develop an applicable software protection technique.  The 
following research actions were required: review of established software protection 
models and related information security disciplines in literature, development of a 
protection algorithm, and demonstration of the developed algorithm using tools and 
techniques openly available to reverse-engineers. 
We selected the virtual black-box model (Barak and others, 2001:2) and the 
obfuscating transform model (Collberg and others, 1997:2-7) as the two mainstream 
models for application protection; the software protection community recognizes both 
models as cornerstone works in this research topic.  Of key interest are how each model 
describes the problem, what solutions are provided under each model, and where 
additional opportunities for refinement exist. 
Data cryptography and hardware security, particularly field-programmable gate 
arrays (FPGAs), were selected as related fields of study, primarily for their emphasis on 
information security and analogous characteristics to the software protection problem.  
We examine both research areas to ascertain how security is characterized, what 
protective mechanisms are used, and how protective mechanisms function to secure 
information from adversaries. 
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1.4 Assumptions and Limitations 
The finite number of test scenarios and generated benchmark programs is a limit 
on how well we can evaluate our proposed methodology.  In addition, the obfuscation 
algorithm‘s ―stamina‖ outside the established test environment remains to be validated by 
the cryptographic community following extensive real world assessment.  In addition, 
known assumptions of the task include future validity of adapted techniques and 
computational power based on historical growth trends. 
1.5 Preview 
Chapter II provides an overview of the current research trends in theoretical and 
practical obfuscation.  We also present terminology and key concepts commonly used 
within the field of software protection.  Chapter III details the methodology for 
construction of the security model and protection technique in addition to the selection of 
metrics and design of benchmarks.  Chapter IV reports on the results of the metrics, 
benchmarks, and techniques.  In addition, we provide an objective evaluation of the 
proposed protection algorithm‘s efficacy based upon predefined criteria established in 
Chapter III.  Chapter V summarizes the results of the research and highlights future 
research areas such as domains outside the software environment that may be able to 
benefit from this research. 
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter examines research literature regarding information protection for 
adapting security techniques in designing and evaluating a general, efficient, and 
measurable software-only software protection method. 
2.2 Objectives of Software Protection  
The broad goal of software protection is to secure software or sensitive portions 
of the software from unauthorized analysis and tampering.  Common applications for 
software protection exist in domains such as digital rights management (DRM), 
embedded systems, cryptographic software and mobile agents.  For clarification, software 
protection is primarily concerned with confidentiality of software execution rather than 
confidentiality of the executed data (Yasinsac and McDonald, 2007:8; Loureiro and 
others, 2002:3). 
2.3 Attacks on Software 
In order to obtain these secrets from software, an adversary commonly employs 
two forms of attacks on software: analysis and tampering.  Software analysis is the most 
crucial step to successful reverse engineering.  Once an attacker understands how the 
internal algorithms function, the attacker can develop countermeasures, strip the 
algorithm for other programs, or extract information embedded in the algorithms, 
depending on his intent. 
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Tampering is purposeful modification of the software‘s behavior.  A common 
example of tampering is applying a software patch to circumvent serial number copy 
protection mechanisms.  Though discussed as a separate form of attack, analysis and 
tampering are closely related.  At least a minimal amount of analysis is required prior to 
tampering; otherwise, the tampering attempt would be a series of random changes and 
unlikely to inflict the behavior desired by the adversary.  Tampering is also commonly a 
part of analysis.  As an extension of the previous copy protection example, an attacker 
can first perform an analysis on the serial number checker in order to build a patch to 
bypass the protection mechanism.  During the analysis, an attacker may inject malicious 
code into the serial checker to better understand how it works through observation of its 
altered behavioral patterns (Cappaert and others, 2004:2).   
While we emphasize counter-analysis approach to software protection in this 
research, we consider techniques regarding anti-tampering due to the tight coupling 
between the two forms of attack.  We also discuss general security models to better 
understand the context in which the attacks operate. 
2.4 Data Cryptography and the Black-box Model 
Cryptography, the practice and study of hiding information, is a related field of 
study that involves keeping secrets and is useful as a framework in illustrating the key 
concepts of software protection.  
In the basic cryptographic model, two parties, Alice and Bob, want to 
communicate secretly with one another.  In this model, Alice and Bob implicitly trust 
each other and use a pre-shared key to encipher and decipher messages.  Eve, an un-
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trusted party, can observe and intercept any messages going between Alice and Bob as 
pictured in Figure 2.  For the purpose of consistency, Alice and Bob will always be 
trusted parties while Eve will also always be a non-trusted party when illustrating 
security concepts and models (―Alice and Bob,‖ 2007).    
 
Figure 2.  Basic Data Cryptography Model 
This basic data cryptography model illustrates the concept of black-box security 
because the security strength is derived from the secret key used in the cryptographic 
primitive and not from hiding how the cryptographic primitive or how the underlying 
algorithm works.  Eve has access to the same cryptographic algorithms that Alice and 
Bob uses to encrypt and decrypt the messages.  However, without the secret key, Eve is 
unable to decrypt any of the messages.   
Because Eve has full access to the algorithm behind the cryptographic primitive, 
she can conduct a black-box attack—a generation of any or all input/output (I/O) pairs.  
Then using statistical analysis, such as a frequency, linear or differential analysis, she can 
attempt to discern a predictable pattern between the input and output that may reveal 
information about the key or message.  Strong encryption algorithms are designed to 
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produce high entropy or randomness in the output to defeat statistical analysis (Preneel 
and others, 2003:13).  In addition, strong encryption algorithms are also designed to make 
it too computationally expensive for Eve to enumerate all I/O pairs.  Otherwise, it would 
be possible for Eve to first generate all I/O pairs, create a lookup table (LUT) of all 
possible I/O, and finally decrypt encoded messages from Alice or Bob against the LUT.  
The reason it is not currently possible for Eve to build a single LUT for a strong 
encryption scheme is because the computation needed to generate all I/O pairs is 
currently infeasible.  For instance, in the case of the Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) which uses 128-bit keys and operates on messages in 128-bit blocks, generating 
the LUT would require computation and storage of 1.4 * 1079 bits (2128 keys * 2128 blocks 
* 128 bits/block) or 1.8 *1069 gigabytes (GB).  The notable caveat to encryption strength 
is that what may be strong presently may not always be strong; the Data Encryption 
Standard (DES) was once considered strong, but has since been determined weak due to 
improvements in hardware that make it possible to crack the key in hours (―Data 
Encryption Standard,‖ 2007).   
It is important to note that encryption strength is not dependent on the secrecy of 
the algorithm.  Cryptographic community approved algorithms such as AES have open-
source implementations and undergo a standardized evaluation process.  This adheres to 
one of Kerckhoff‘s cryptography principles where the strength of encryption should not 
be based on the obscurity of the encryption algorithms or the lack of understanding in 
how the algorithms operate (―Kerckhoff‘s principle,‖ 2007).  The open-sourced nature of 
cryptographic primitives also allows developers to implement the algorithms as designed 
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in any cryptosystem as a measure to prevent improper implementation from inadvertently 
weakening the strength of the encryption algorithm.   
2.5 Software Obfuscation and the White-Box Model 
We make a few important observations about the black-box model that highlights 
characteristics of the white-box security model and the associated challenges with respect 
to software protection.  The first observation is distinguishing what is secret and what the 
secret protects.  In data cryptography, the pre-shared key is the secret used to hide the 
message as seemingly garbage data.  In software protection, the software program or 
more specifically, the algorithm is the secret.  Thus, something must prevent Eve from 
analyzing how the secret algorithm works.  This leads to the second critical observation 
that Alice and Bob, at the two ends of the encryption/decryption process, are both trusted 
parties in data cryptography.  In contrast, Alice must cooperate with Eve, the un-trusted 
party in the software protection scenario.  Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between 
Alice and Eve in the standard software protection model to contrast their relationship in 
the basic cryptography model shown in Figure 2.     
 
Figure 3.  Software Obfuscation Model 
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A third observation shows the significance of this fact.  In the traditional 
cryptographic model, Eve is not involved in the encryption and decryption process that 
occurs at the ends of the secret sharing process; she is, therefore, never privy to the secret 
that enables secure message transfer.  Software protection, in contrast, requires her to 
either implicitly or explicitly know the secret because the executable code is the secret 
and she has the code.  This yields yet another observation.  An enciphered message 
passed in the open is useless except to someone with the proper decryption key.  
Software, however, must be at least interpretable by a compiler to execute; otherwise, 
there would be no reason for Alice to give Eve the program if Eve could not execute it.  
This, in turn, means that even after protection mechanisms are applied, the secret must 
remain interpretable on Eve‘s machine.   
Table 1 is a summary of the distinctions between confidentiality of data 
(cryptography) and confidentiality of execution (software obfuscation).  Of note, there 
exists a distinction between program structure, typically the source code, and program 
functionality, the algorithm‘s I/O.  The distinctions between the data cryptography 
security model section illustrate that software protection does not conform well to the 
black-box security model alone.  
Table 1.  Differences Between Confidentiality of Data and Execution 
Confidentiality  Data Execution 
Secret Object key  program  
Protected Object message  program structure  
Distributed or Public Object encrypted message   program functionality   
Actors privy to Secret Object Alice, Bob Alice 
Actors accessing Protected Object Alice, Bob Eve 
Actors denied Secret Object Eve Eve 
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Because Eve controls the operating environment of the software, the host 
environment can be used against the mechanisms protecting the application.   Chow and 
others specifically states that in a white-box attack context, the adversary has three 
capabilities.  First, the cryptographic software shares a host with the fully-privileged 
attack software with complete access to implementations of encryption algorithms.  
Because the attack software has the maximum (―admin‖) privileges allowed on the host, 
the target software cannot expect access rights within environment to offer any form of 
protection from the attack software.  Second, dynamic execution of the target program is 
observable.  This fact implies that Eve can monitor the execution of the target program‘s 
individual instructions to learn each instruction‘s behavior.  Closely tied is the third 
capability where the adversary has complete view of the internal algorithm and can alter 
it at will.  Combined with the second capability, the adversary is thus able to see the 
entire algorithm, run it line by line, and alter the instructions to analyze the target 
program.  This capability allows the aforementioned, tampering in the process analysis, 
whereby Eve can inject code into the target program in order to gain understanding of 
how the program works (Chow and others, 2002:4). 
Noting these capabilities, it is possible to understand why symmetric pre-shared 
key cryptographic primitives are strong in the black-box security model but vulnerable in 
the white-box security model.  An example of this fact is the program encryption 
technique which encrypts a program and decrypts it during runtime.  Once encrypted, the 
original program is no longer an executable program and therefore requires decryption 
prior to run-time.  It follows that during execution, an unencrypted and thus, unprotected 
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version of the program will exist in memory on the host environment.  Under the white-
box attack context, the unprotected version is subjected to analysis attacks on the host 
memory.  Therefore, an attacker can bypass the code encryption by performing run-time 
analyses to directly observe or modify the unprotected code in memory as seen in Figure 
4 (Collberg and others, 1997:5; Eilam, 2005:330). 
 
Figure 4.  Program Encryption Model 
Because the program encryption technique does not hold under the white-box 
security model, it is an insufficient means of software protection when used as the sole 
defense mechanism.  For clarification, we are interested in protection encryption 
techniques that produce executable encrypted code in contrast to the approach in Figure 4 
which produces non-executable encrypted code. 
Giving the secret to the adversary is counter-intuitive to protecting it.  Despite the 
difficulties faced in the white-box model, the challenges of the white-box model are a 
reality for software protection.   
2.6 Theoretical Obfuscation and the Virtual Black-Box  
In their seminal work on software obfuscation, Barak and others propose the 
virtual-black box (VBB) obfuscation model to characterize software security in the 
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white-box model.  VBB established three properties that laid the groundwork for most 
theoretical discussions about software obfuscation.  Critical to these properties is the 
concept of the obfuscator (O), which accepts a program (P) such that a new obfuscated 
program (O(P)) is generated.  First, O(P) must produce the same output as P—this is 
sometimes referred to as the function preserving property.  Second, any computation by 
O(P)  is performed with efficiency consistent with oracle access to P—this requires O(P) 
to run in the same computational time complexity, such as polynomial time, as P.  
Finally, the structure of O(P) must not provide Eve any useful information about the 
structure of P—this recognizes that software obfuscation is a white-box problem.  
Informally, an O that achieves all three properties means that Eve cannot discover more 
information from analyzing O(P) than from black-box analysis of P (Barak and others, 
2001:2).  
 In their work, however, they construct theoretical arguments that show that it may 
be impossible to create a general purpose obfuscator that satisfies all three properties in 
the VBB model.  They construct their argument by creating an efficiently calculated 
family of functions that provides more information about the function than just oracle 
access to the original code.  Their ―impossibility‖ results have spurned many research 
directions under software protection.  First, because the impossibility result only 
precludes the existence of general obfuscators for all functions, there is a search for 
obfuscate-able families of functions.  Second, there is a search for alternate security 
models that may better describe the software protection problem better than VBB.  Barak 
and others concede in their work that the three properties making up VBB may not be a 
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practical model (Barak and others, 2001:30; Hofheinz and others, 2007:218-222).  New 
models modify one of the three properties in VBB or attempt to define the maximum 
obfuscation that can be achieved (Goldwasser and Rothblum, 2007:194).  Other research 
directions include specific obfuscation techniques that, despite the impossibility results, 
are practically implementable as a means to slow down analysis attacks (Lynn and others, 
2004:11).  
2. 6 Applications 
The following applications for software protection are presented to better 
understand the white-box security model and the software protection problem as well as 
motivation for this line of research.  In addition, some applications illustrate why Alice 
may want to coordinate with an un-trusted party, Eve. 
2.6.1 Cryptographic Software. 
Cryptographic primitives are designed to operate within the black-box attack 
context and not the white-box attack context.  This is a limitation in their use because the 
user must be concerned with where their software is installed.  For instance, it is unwise 
to install unprotected cryptographic software on a random terminal because it could be 
under adversarial control and thus have plain-view of the secret symmetric or asymmetric 
keys entered into the software (Chow, 2002:252).  If the cryptographic software could 
prevent the secret keys used in encryption from observation in the malicious 
environment, then users could perform secure message transfer in non-secure 
environments. 
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2.6.2 E-Commerce. 
E-commerce applications often embed cryptographic keys and are a specific 
application of cryptographic software.  More specifically, cryptography is used to ensure 
privacy, confidentiality and overall security through means such as e-certificates and 
digital signatures (Cappaert and others, 2004:31).  
2.6.3 Digital Rights Management (DRM). 
One of the biggest challenges with the prevalence and ease in spread of digital 
data is tracking and receiving revenue from creative media shared on the internet.  
Software protection measures are needed so that only those who have the rights to the 
media would be able to use it.  Because the possibility of transferring the media file to a 
malicious buyer exists, software protection could help in deterring unauthorized 
duplication from those that may have legitimately purchased the item.  In addition, 
specific protection techniques could watermark an item so that unauthorized copies are 
traceable to a unique user in order for the intellectual property owner to pursue legal 
action (―Digital Rights,‖ 2007). 
2.6.4 Software Agents. 
Software agents are an abstract concept to describe pieces of software that acts on 
the behalf of the owner of the agent.  There exists many possible uses for software agents 
but the common thread in every instance is that the agents may ―travel‖ to potentially un-
trusted environments while carrying sensitive information about the owner in order to 
perform its function.  In this regard, the software protection allows the owner to deploy 
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his agents to perform their task without fear that his private information may be extracted 
from them (―Software Agent,‖ 2007; Sander and Tschudin, 1998a:2). 
2.6.4.1 Shopping/Auction Agents. 
In the case of a shopping agent, the owner deploys the agent to vendors 
but would not want any vendor to know the highest acceptable price would be for 
an item.  Protecting the embedded thresholds on the agent would prevent the 
threat that a malicious vendor could artificially inflate the prices by extracting the 
owner‘s highest acceptable price.  Fundamentally, the vendor would always want 
to know the buyer‘s strategy to produce the highest price acceptable by the buyer, 
while the buyer has an incentive to keep his information private to obtain the best 
price possible (Algesheimer and others, 2003:11). 
2.6.4.1 Monitoring-and-Surveillance (MaS) Agents. 
The typical use for a MaS agent is to observe and report on computing 
equipment or services.  If an attack on a Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) system also compromised its monitoring MaS agent, it 
could impair authorities from detecting and responding to the attack on the 
SCADA system.   
It is also possible to purposely deploy MaS agents to monitor adversarial 
networks and collect intelligence.  When used as an intelligence asset, it is 
typically desirable that the agent not divulge the owner‘s identity in addition to 
the type of information the agent was tasked to record.  Furthermore, the owner 
would want to prevent the adversary from learning how to create adversarial MaS 
 
20 
agents through reverse-engineering of any captured MaS agents (―Software 
Agent,‖ 2007). 
2.6.4 Embedded Systems.  
 Embedded systems such as smart cards can benefit from software protection 
because of their highly distributive nature and their use in commercial applications.  
Smart cards often embed cryptographic keys but cannot afford the size increase in using 
full hardware anti-tampering techniques.   
 One notable hardware and DRM example is the Content Scramble System (CSS) 
distributed with DVD-players, DVD-drives, and the DVDs.  CSS keys protect DVDs as a 
means to prevent unauthorized copying and distribution.  Built-in CSS decryptors in 
DVD-players and DVD-drives decrypt the content on the DVDs to play them.  Thus, this 
is a white-box security problem because the decryption mechanism and key are 
distributed to potentially malicious users.  One malicious user, in 1999, successfully 
analyzed the CSS algorithm and produced a De-CSS algorithm, circumventing the 
protection mechanism (―Content Scramble System,‖ 2007).   
2.7 Software-based Protection 
We focus on software-based approaches in this research because, in general, 
software-based techniques tend to be more compatible with existing systems.  Since 
software-based protection techniques are typically modifications to the original program 
code, any hardware running the original code should also be able to run the software-
protected code.  This flexibility, in turn, offers an added layer of protection through 
frequent updates.  In contrast, hardware techniques suffer from incompatibility with the 
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original operating platform thereby incurring relatively higher costs when implementing 
protective mechanisms.  Hardware characteristics such as power consumption and time 
analysis may also leak information about the original system through side-channels 
despite protective white-box measures (Cappaert and others, 2004:8).  
It is useful, however, to examine traditional hardware protection approaches 
because hardware are physical items that must also be protected in both black-box and 
white-box attack contexts.  An adversary could use a black-box approach and determine 
how the circuit works or develop another circuit which mimics the behavior of observed 
I/O-pairs (Christiansen, 2006:1).  Anti-black-box methods are available to confuse the 
I/O-pairs, but are viewable in the white-box context.  As a physical item, physical 
protection is an option in addition to the fact that hardware is more difficult to duplicate; 
this is an important factor because the amount of resources available to an adversary such 
as a college hacker, non-state actor, or nation-state intelligence agency can vary wildly.  
Therefore, strong physical anti-tampering measures can make the adversary assess the 
risk between conducting white-box attacks on the samples for information and destroying 
the finite number of samples.   
Duplication of non-protected software code, conversely, is usually easy and only 
requires low-cost or even open-sourced tools.  In addition, an adversary can safely tamper 
software with the capability to repeatedly revert to a backup copy if the working copy 
becomes unsalvageable.  In summary, software-based protection must reflect the unique 
challenges of the software environment (Cappaert and others, 2004:8-9). 
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2.8 Current Solutions 
 We examine practical solutions and analyze their approach to the software 
protection problem. 
2.8.1 Client-Server. 
The effect of using a client-server solution is to force the adversary into a black-
box attack context by storing a protected program on a protected server that is accessible 
remotely by the client.  Thus, the adversary can only feed input into the client and receive 
output generated from the server.  If the algorithm that needs protection is 
computationally intensive, then the server must bear the computational load.  
Improvements to this approach offload as much of the non-sensitive on the client side.  
However, there is a limit to the amount of the processing of the protected function 
computable on the client because removing access to the critical portion of the code is the 
sole protective measure.  In addition, there is a high reliance on the interactive 
communication between the server and client that may not be possible or desirable for 
certain applications such as intelligence MaS agents.  The challenges presented in the 
white-box attack context are averted because the fundamental concept in this security 
technique is protection of the server rather than protection of the software (Cappaert and 
others, 2004:10). 
2.8.2 Code Encryption. 
The white-box security model section, illustrated in Figure 4, shows how standard 
data encryption schemes applied directly to code is typically insufficient as a software 
protection.  In a work on mobile agents, Sander and Tschudin propose a scheme that uses 
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homomorphic functions as a specific form of code encryption that may work in the white-
box attack context.  However, few homomorphic functions exist and are themselves a 
subject of research with few available implementations (Sander and Tschudin, 1998a:9-
10). 
 2.8.3 Obfuscating Transforms. 
Collberg and others‘ works are examples of research emphasizing implementable 
techniques for obfuscation to provide practical levels of security.  The basic appeal in 
their work is that like data encryption, obfuscation is a process that delays the adversary 
from achieving his goal (Collberg and others, 2002:738).  Data encryption uses math and 
complexity theory to estimate the theoretical maximum amount of time an adversary 
would need to successfully conduct a brute-force attack, where an adversary generates all 
possible combinations to decipher the hidden message.  Brute-force attacks use the entire 
input space and therefore guarantee success by definition.  However, secure data 
cryptographic schemes ensure that a full brute-force attack would take an unpractical 
amount of time to complete with current computer processing capabilities.  Effectively, 
cryptography delays the adversary from knowing the encrypted information until it is of 
negligible value or until newer technology and faster technology is available to execute 
the brute-force attack.  In either case, cryptography does not claim impregnability, but 
merely a mathematically measured amount of delay.  Similarly, Collberg and others 
propose that given enough time, a competent reverse engineer can reverse any software 
program (Collberg and others, 1997:1-29).  According to their current works, however, it 
is not possible to mathematically derive the amount of delay on analysis.  Instead, their 
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foundational work on the taxonomy of obfuscation techniques focuses on classifying the 
types of the obfuscating transform mechanisms and their relative security to each other.  
A quality metric composed from four properties: obscurity, resilience, cost and stealth.  
An abstract scale for each property provides a relative measure on the approximation of 
strength of one technique against one other. 
Generally, their proposed obfuscation techniques provide white-box protection 
using conventionally poor software engineering techniques.  Therefore, the metrics 
proposed to measure obfuscation are derived from sound software engineering principles.  
The quality of each technique is assessed according to four core properties (Collberg and 
others, 1997:7).   
2.8.3.1 Obscurity. 
Obscurity is a measure of complexity or unintelligible-ness of P or 
more importantly, O(P).  This metric is conceded by the authors to be 
vague since it is an attempt to quantify cognitive ability using the q-
property, a loosely defined property that makes O(P) more complex than 
P.  Thus, the reverse-engineering attempt of O(P) should be more time 
consuming than reversing attempt of P if the q-property is greater in O(P) 
(Collberg and others, 1997:7; 2002:4). 
2.8.3.2 Resilience. 
Resilience is similar to obscurity.  While obscurity is based on 
confusing a human‘s understanding of O(P), resilience is based on a 
technique‘s ability to defeat automatic machine de-obfuscators.  Because 
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de-obfuscators must first be programmed by a person, resilience is a 
combined measurement of both the time it takes a programmer to 
construct the de-obfuscator and the time it takes the de-obfuscator to 
reduce the obscurity of O(P).  A de-obfuscator‘s effort is often described 
in classical complexity terms such as polynomial-time or exponential-time 
(Collberg and others, 1997:8; 2002:4). 
2.8.3.3 Cost. 
Cost is the amount of execution-time and memory space incurred 
by the obfuscation technique and often described in classical complexity 
terms and bytes, respectively.  If a technique is prohibitively expensive, it 
would be of little practical value regardless of the increase in security 
because O(P) may no longer meet non-security related criteria required in 
P (Collberg and others, 1997:9; 2002:4).  
2.8.3.4 Stealth. 
Stealth is used in a special application of obfuscation for 
watermarking.  It is a property that measures the closeness in statistical 
similarities between the original code in P and O(P).  Software protection 
techniques that use obfuscating transforms as a watermark would attempt 
to increase this property to avoid detection (Collberg and others, 
2002:738).   
These four properties describe the obfuscating transform model because they were 
conceived as ways to evaluate the various practical obfuscation implementations through 
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transformation of source code.  Collberg and other‘s work falls short on meeting the 
scrutiny of the cryptographic community but makes significant strides in achieving 
positive results for obfuscation that are capable of practical implementation today 
(Collberg and others, 2002:738). 
2.8.4 Hardware Techniques. 
Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) blur the distinction between hardware 
and software.  FPGAs‘ logic are programmable post-production  and have the advantage 
of having shorter time-to-market costs due to lower non-recurring engineering costs and 
easier patching of bug fixes.  The white-box security model applies to FPGAs because 
the FPGA can fall into adversarial hands.  The logical programming of the FPGA is the 
proprietary secret that must require protection and can be protected through software 
protection means rather than through hardware anti-tampering measures alone (Vahid, 
2007:106). 
 Hardware has the advantage of being a physical device.  AFRL/SPI has explored 
solutions such as the embedding of a small explosive payload on top of FPGA boards that 
upon tampering destroy the board.  A software equivalent might be a malware or virus 
embedded into the software that activates upon detection of a dissassember on debugger 
on the host environment or upon knowing that it is running within a virtual machine 
environment.  This type of protection focuses therefore on breaking the specific analysis 
tools rather than the adversary.  While this is a valid approach and an active avenue of 
research, it produces an arms race of techniques where analysis tools and anti-analysis 
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tool techniques are incrementally patched to compensate for new developments (Eilam, 
2005:328-329; Travis, 2001).  
2.9 Bridging Theory and Practice  
This research attempts to model a software protection model that is practically 
implementable with quantifiable metrics to bridge the gap between theoretical 
obfuscation and practical implementation.  Chapter III details the methodology used in 
the proposed model‘s architecture and the experiments we performed to examine the 
model. 
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III. Methodology 
3. 1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter describes the research experiments, beginning with presentation of 
the research goal and approach.  We describe the test boundaries and services followed 
by the metrics we use to interpret the results of the experiments.  Finally, we present the 
experimental design to describe how the set of experiments answers questions posed in 
the problem definition. 
3.2 Problem Definition  
Three attributes generally characterize software protection techniques: applicability, 
efficiency, and security.  The Holy Grail of software techniques would be one that is 
general in application, secure in implementation, and efficient in execution.  Thus far, 
however, research in theoretical obfuscation has yielded positive results that are provably 
secure but applicable for only specific functional families (Lynn and others, 2004:11).   
Practical obfuscation approaches use software engineering metrics that are easily 
applicable to existing software.  Security metrics, however, remains a research area 
because breaking software protection techniques is in part art and in part science.  
Software engineering metrics were conceived as metrics to gauge the likelihood of 
coding errors, not as security metrics.  Thus, the software engineering derived metrics 
and corresponding properties for evaluating software obfuscation are understandably 
weaker than metrics used by traditional cryptographers in evaluating cryptographic 
algorithms.  This suggests obfuscation techniques with more generically quantifiable 
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metrics, independent of cognitive ability, would appeal to both experts in practical and 
theoretical obfuscation.  Table 2 presents software engineering metrics in white (Collberg 
and others, 1997:8) and cryptographic metrics in grey for comparison (―National 
Institute,‖ 2001).  We note that the software engineering metrics are traditionally used to 
assess program complexity where an increase in a metric indicates increased overall 
complexity while the cryptography metrics are used to indicate the randomness of a bit 
string produced by encryption algorithms or pseudo-random number generators.  A bit 
string with high randomness means that it is difficult to guess the outcome of a bit with 
greater than 50% accuracy.  
Table 2.  Measures in Software Engineering and Cryptography 
Metric Short description 
Program Length Number of operators and operands in P 
Cyclomatic Complexity Number of predicates in functions 
Nesting Complexity Number of nesting level of conditionals 
Data Flow Complexity Number of inter-basic block variables 
Fan-in/out Complexity Number of formal parameters and/or global variables 
Data Structure Complexity Number of fields, size, type of static data structures 
Object-Orientated Complexity Number of depth, inheritance, methods, coupling 
Frequency   Proportion of 0‘s and 1‘s 
Frequency Within a Block Proportion of 0‘s and 1‘s within multiple sequences 
Longest Runs of 1’s in a Block Length of uninterrupted sequence of 1‘s 
Runs of 0’s and 1’s Number of uninterrupted runs of 0‘s and 1‘s 
Cumulative Sum Sum of partial sequences after mapping (0,1) to (-1,1) 
Random Excursions Number of cumulative sum cycles with 0 sum 
Random Excursions Variant Number of sums within cumulative sum cycles 
 
This research proposes a software-only approach using compositional function 
tables (CFT) and embedded symmetric key cryptography to produce functional entropy 
on a small scale for the protection of deterministic functions.  Functional tables are the 
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perfect white-box because only the input/output pairs are made available.  Thus, a 
function table provides just the black-box information.  By replacing a deterministic 
function with a function table, we strip the structural implementation of the function to 
prevent white-box analysis by the adversary. 
The objective of this research is to examine the effectiveness of symmetric key 
cryptography and CFTs as a software-only protection technique.  Of primary interest is 
how well this approach quantifies obfuscation strength with measures and metrics 
consistent with ones used in traditional data cryptography.  In addition, this research 
proposes a set of benchmark programs to demonstrate this approach and may be useful in 
determining effectiveness of current and future obfuscation techniques.  Finally, we 
evaluate the generality and efficiency of the CFT approach.  
We select Java programs and methods to implement our experiments because 
decompiled Java code of unprotected functions is very similar to the original Java source 
code providing a greater contrast between decompilations of protected and unprotected 
code.  Compiled Java code is also more understandable because it compiles into a well-
documented bytecode format which retains internal symbolic information, such as class 
names, that help the adversary and Java de-compilers, such as Mocha, reconstruct the 
original source code and logic.  In contrast, C/C++ code compiles into microprocessor 
instructions that contain less information about the original code and therefore gives less 
information to an adversary.  Popular C/C++ reverse-engineering tools, such as OllyDbg 
and IdaPro, are dissassmblers which generates the assembly level instructions, rather than 
the original source code making qualitative comparison against original source code more 
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difficult.  Furthermore, Java is a popular choice for web applications that often execute 
on un-trusted environments.  For these reasons, we chose Java as the language to 
implement this research‘s experiments (Travis, 2000; Torri and others, 2007). 
3.3 Alternate Obfuscation Model 
The VBB model indisputably describes the ideal criteria for software obfuscation.  
However, theoretical research has shown that this ideal model is impractical.  Therefore, 
an alternative model is necessary to describe a set of obfuscation criteria that does not 
lead to the same impossibility results produced by Barak and others.  
The three criteria established by the VBB model state that an obfuscated version 
must preserve functionality of the original, perform in equivalent time to the original, and 
reveal no information about the original that cannot be obtained by having only black-
box access to the original.  This research examines a model that removes the first 
criterion:  function preservation.  Removing this criterion is clearly a weakening of the 
VBB model, but in turn shelters this new model from the established impossibility 
results.  Of note, this alternate model clearly distinguishes between the structure of 
program (white-box information) and the function of the program (black-box 
information) to reflect our observations in Table 1 where we identified differences 
between the data cryptography model and the general software obfuscation model.  
McDonald and Yasinsac propose that obfuscation, at best, protects the structure, protects 
the functional relationship, or protects both naming this the intent protection model 
(McDonald and Yasinsac, 2007:2-3).   
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Other research works also support black-box protection of the function output as a 
means to obfuscate the white-box structure.  Sander and Tschudin propose a protocol for 
computing with encrypted functions (CEF) under the premise that reversing the 
underlying proprietary functions generally more useful than full reversal of the program 
(Sander and Tschudin, 1998b:2).  Loureiro and others uses a Boolean equation set 
representation of the function table approach with the McEliece asymmetric 
cryptographic algorithm which encrypts the output as an obfuscation technique (Loureiro 
and others, 2002:4).  Chow and others also use combinations of function tables to 
integrate their white-box version of the AES algorithm to protect other functions (Chow 
and others, 2002:252).  These works all emphasize the need to modify the functionality of 
the original function as part of an obfuscation technique.  We noted that the output is 
unusable until it is converted back to some usable form, which is usually done on a 
trusted environment.  Figure 5 graphically illustrates this intent protection model for 
comparison with the VBB standard obfuscation model in Figure 3 and the standard 
cryptography model in Figure 2. 
While it appears that this is the client-server model, there is a key distinction.  
Traditional client-server hides the proprietary algorithm on the server side forcing the 
server to bear the computational load.  In contrast, the objective of the partial client-
server model is to safely offload the computational load onto the client.   For example, a 
MaS agent, such as the ones described in the previous chapter, can perform secure 
computations within an un-trusted execution environment and then send information back 
to the issuer. 
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Figure 5.  Intent Protection Obfuscation Model 
 Intent protection weakens the first criterion (functional preservation) of the VBB 
model.  However, by providing functional confidentiality, it may be possible to 
strengthen protection overall through the third VBB criterion (structural confidentiality).  
Because VBB requires functional preservation, analysis of black-box information in the 
original and obfuscated version of the function may allow the adversary to extrapolate the 
white-box information.  This is acceptable, though unintuitive, in the VBB model, 
especially when we know that adversaries use a combination of black-box and white-box 
attacks.  Conversely, if it is acceptable within an obfuscation model to change the 
functionality of the obfuscated program, then it is possible to apply techniques that 
prevent deduction of white-box information through black-box analysis.   
We thus revisit data cryptographic techniques since their primary function 
prevents black-box analysis.  We note that any encryption of the output is still in a white-
box attackable environment and thus methods for white-box encryption require 
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examination.  Figure 6 illustrates the data cryptographic model on the left with the intent 
protection model on the right for comparison.   
 
Figure 6.  Data cryptography (left) and Intent Protection (right) 
 As stated previously, we divide a function into its functional behavior and its 
structure.  While an encryption only makes the output appear as random output, we 
postulate that an obfuscator must also protect the white-box information.  We could 
achieve this by either removing structural information or by emulating structural 
randomness.  Thus, this research examines the input/output produced by random 
programs for comparison with similar sized functions to gain understanding on the 
relationship between the randomness in a program structure with the randomness in the 
output.  To the best knowledge of this research, the relationship between random 
structures and corresponding output characteristics is unknown.  If obfuscation is 
analogous to cryptography, then we can make the same analytical comparisons on the 
output.  For instance, in order to gauge how well an encryption produces a pseudo-
random output, it must exhibit characteristics comparable to a truly random sequence.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a list of established 
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metrics that can empirically determine how closely a sequence exhibits randomness 
(―National Institute,‖ 2001).  Methods to accurately assess the level of randomness of 
function or program structure are, at this point, unknown and a reason why it is difficult 
to practically evaluate practical obfuscation techniques under VBB model‘s security test 
posed by the third criterion.   
This research postulates that any program generated by randomly selecting bit 
manipulations between the input and output is a random program.  Specific 
implementation details on how this research creates random programs are in the 
experimental section.  By creating randomly generated programs, it is possible to 
examine their output using statistical measures.  If random programs generate non-
random output, then it is possible that obfuscation through randomization of structure is 
sufficient because the output does not correlate strongly to the structure.  An indicator of 
this would be a large set of random programs that produce the same output pattern.  If 
random programs tend to generate random output, then any program, original or 
obfuscated, that does not produce random output may indicate that a strong relationship 
between black-box patterns and white-box structure exists.  Therefore, even if 
randomness is induced into the structure, it may never be sufficiently enough due to the 
predictability of the output.  Security then requires a mechanism to produce randomness 
in the output which intent protection model supports (Hofheinz and others, 2007:17; 
Algesheimer and others, 2003:5). 
Figure 7 illustrates the comparisons made in this research under the intent 
protection model relative to the comparisons made in the VBB model.  In summary, the 
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obfuscation community has yet to agree on how to make structure comparisons for white-
box security.  Without consensus on the structural security measure, it is difficult for 
practical obfuscation techniques to claim meeting the VBB security test as shown by the 
leftmost arrow.  Thus, we propose the random program model, where O(P) is made to 
functionally and structurally resemble random programs (PR), as a derivation of the 
random oracle model in cryptography (Bellare and Rogaway, 1995).  Constructing PR 
serves as an intermediate step in understanding and evaluating function structure and 
output patterns.  We can use the results to develop techniques so that O(P) exhibits both 
functional and structural characteristics of PR.  
 
Figure 7.  Obfuscation and Random Programs 
Canetti and others prove in their work that work that techniques secure in the random 
based methodology may be insecure in implementation.  However, we note that the 
cryptographic community uses the random oracle because the standard cryptography 
model based solely on complexity measures is difficult to prove.  Therefore, our appeal to 
randomness is primarily to establish a sanity check on obfuscation approaches, as 
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recommended by Canetti and others in their conclusions, in absence of a stronger security 
model (Canetti and others, 2006). 
3. 4 Function Tables 
We examine the removal of white-box information as an obfuscation measure.  
For this approach, a function table, which is a list of input/output mappings, is used.  
Every deterministic algorithm produces a function table.  As stated previously, a function 
table hides all white-box information making it a perfect white-box.   
Correspondingly, a function table is also an atomic function; it is not possible to 
observe, insert, divide or otherwise tamper with the instructions that generate the 
input/output pairs within the function (Yasinsac and McDonald, 2007:2-10).  This 
concept is illustrated in Figure 8 using a generic function, f: {0,1}x  {0,1}y where xn 
inputs map to yn outputs. 
 
Figure 8.  A Generic Function and its Function Table Representation 
We note that an infinite amount of functions can produce the same function table.  
For instance, the same table is produced by the deterministic function, f(2x), is the same 
as f(x+x) and f(x<<1).  However, it is not possible to tell from the function table alone 
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whether we used an addition, multiplication, or left shift operation in this simple 
example. 
A generic encryption function, E, is also a function that takes an input and 
generates an output.  Only a few characteristics distinguish an encryption function from a 
generic function.  First, encryption functions have the property where the input and 
output generated are the same size.  Second, the relationship of input and output for a 
particular encryption is identified by an key, {0,1}k.  The relationship between f, E, x, y 
and k are shown in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9.  Generic Function (left) and Generic Encryption Function (right) 
The output of a strong cryptographic function is designed to exhibit randomness 
such that it is not possible to guess the output from previous input or input patterns.  
Thus, the functional table of an encryption function operates like a random oracle—a 
black-box that responds with a uniformly random response.  Because a truly random 
oracle only exists as a theoretical mathematical construct, an encryption function is 
actually generating pseudo-randomness.  
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  Strong cryptographic algorithms, such as AES, must exhibit sufficient empirical 
randomness in the output to make it resistant to linear or differential analysis attacks.  We 
note that empirical security does not offer perfect secrecy such as a one-time pad 
(―National Institute,‖ 2001; Jorstad, 1997).  However, it is of sufficient practical strength 
that the National Security Agency (NSA) approved the AES algorithm for encrypting 
documents up to Secret classification.  The randomness, or more accurately, pseudo-
randomness is predictable only by knowing the cryptographic algorithm and the secret 
shared key.  Due to the atomic property of function tables, all cryptographic 
implementation details, such as the secret key, are embedded within the table.  Therefore, 
the adversary cannot view the key nor extract it through static or dynamic analysis once 
we make the table.  For clarification, we list k with xn in Figure 9 because it is a required 
input for the encryption function to generate yn.  Once we construct the table, however, an 
encryption function table would only include xn and yn. 
A non-extractable key has significant security implications because it is now 
possible for symmetric key cryptographic primitives to securely operate in malicious 
environments.  Thus, this research proposes to use atomic properties of the function table 
to white-box protect cryptographic primitives. 
3.5 Function Composition with Function Tables 
Functional composition, (f o g) or f(g(x)), is also an atomic operation.  Because 
the composition of two atomic functions is also an atomic function, it is not possible to 
find a seam between the two composed functions.  We expect this because the seam is an 
implementation detail inherently hidden within the produced function table.  As a result, 
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a composite function table (CFT) protects the white-box information from each 
component functions in addition to the seam between them. 
Composition on two functions is possible if the output of the first function is a 
subset of the input of the second function.  Figure 10 is an illustration of a composite 
function of f and g.  We see that the CFT of (f o g) masks f and g’s individual 
input/output relationship; xm thus directly relates to yn with the intermediate information, 
ym and xn, embedded in the CFT. 
 
Figure 10.  Function composition of f and g where ym  xn 
Without the intermediate information, it is difficult for an adversary to divide the 
table back into separate tables for f and g.  To break apart the composition, he must 
compute all function tables equivalent to the input/output-size of the CFT; this is a super-
exponential process.  While not prohibitive for small inputs such as n=16 where nn = 264, 
it is computationally infeasible for larger inputs such as when n>32 and where nn>=2160.  
Even for smaller inputs, the adversary must test combinations of generated function 
tables which is an n-factorial process (Yasinsac and McDonald, 2007:10). 
3.5.1 Function + Encryption (F+E) Function Table. 
  The atomic properties of CFTs are the fundamental basis for our approach of 
securing a generic deterministic function, f, with an encryption function, E.   
Encryption is essentially a recoverable semantic translation of some input.  We 
use an one-bit input, one-bit output function to illustrate the CFT approach.  There are 
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exactly four semantic transformations, or behaviors, available to a function that operates 
on one bit which we list in Table 3.  Within the table, we use a Boolean gate as the 
encryption function with another single bit as the key.   
Table 3.  List of Semantic Transformations and Sample Input and Output 
Semantic Transformations  Candidate Encryption x y 
1. Preserve the input  y = OR(x, 0) 0, 1, 1, 0 0, 1, 1, 0 
2. Flip the input y = XOR(x, 1) 0, 1, 1, 0 1, 0, 0, 1 
3. Flip 1‘s, preserve 0‘s y = AND(x, 0) 0, 1, 1, 0 0, 0, 0, 0 
4. Flip 0‘s, preserve 1‘s y = OR(x, 1) 0, 1, 1, 0 1, 1, 1, 1 
 
The choice between the first and second semantic transformation is the best 
obfuscation possible for this trivial one-bit case because the adversary has, at best, a 50% 
chance of guessing whether we used the first or second transformation.  The third and 
fourth semantic transformations are unsuitable candidates as an encryption function 
because they produce irrecoverable output.  We note that the candidate encryptions in 
Table 3 are not the only possible implementation of the semantic transformation; an 
infinite number of functions can produce the same transformation.  In summary, by 
selecting and composing a function table with an encryption table, the produced (f  E) 
CFT embeds within it, the input/output of f, the input/output of E, the k used in E, and the 
seam between f and E. 
Popular encryptions, such as DES and AES, are recoverable semantic 
transformations whose behavior and recoverability is determined by the key and mode of 
operation.  We chose electronic code book (ECB) as the mode of operation due to the 
necessity in enumerating input/output pairs for the encryption function table.   
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The primary weakness of ECB is that it does not hide patterns; identical plaintext 
blocks encrypt into identical ciphertext blocks.  However, other modes of operation such 
as cipher-block chaining (CBC), cipher feedback mode (CFB) and others require the 
cryptographic primitive to have sense of causality; to generate the current ciphertext 
block requires information from a previous iteration.  In other cases, a keystream, 
generated from the original key is used instead of the key for every new block of 
ciphertext.  In either instance, the resulting functional tables would be super-exponential 
because all sequences need enumeration and mapping in order to fully construct the table.  
A single functional table can encapsulate the input/output mapping for an ECB operating 
encryption more compactly than for any other mode of operation (―Block Cipher,‖ 2007).   
To compensate for the leakage of input patterns, we suggest using padding 
schemes on the output of the first function before composing it with the second function.  
The most essential requirement for padding is that the receiver can distinguish the 
padding from the cipher text.  Since decryption functional tables are a mirror of the 
encryption tables, any padding can satisfy this basic requirement because the padding that 
was included in the encryption table is reflected in the decryption table.  We examine 
secure padding, such as RSA-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption padding) designed 
to achieve statistically distributed 2n output.  We note, however, that we use random 
bijection tables rather than the RSA-OAEP to provide padding in this research so we 
have control over the size of the input and output space which may be smaller than the 
padding provided RSA-OAEP.  Patterns in functional output carried through by the 
encryption algorithm in ECB is thus masked by the padding forcing the adversary to 
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perform the super-exponential enumeration black-box attack plus the factorial process for 
combining function tables. 
ECB has another weakness; it does not provide means for data integrity 
protection.  This means that it is possible for an adversary to conduct replay attacks 
where the adversary interrupts the normal input process by inserting an input recorded 
previously.  Though we note this is problematic for communication protocols, our current 
focus is using the encryption to protect the structure and functionality of the first function 
in the CFT, rather than protecting the system against communication protocol attacks. 
3.6 Output Recovery 
A decryption table is simply a reverse lookup of the encryption table and 
automatically created upon creation of the encryption table which is an exponential 
process.  Because we perform decryption on the trusted side in the intent protection 
model, decryption does not need to be in the form of a function table because as long as 
the symmetric key is known, we can use a standard decryption primitive.  This allows an 
issuer to distribute an obfuscated program using CFT and let a different trusted source 
receive and use the encrypted information without sending the entire enumerated table.  
This is beneficial if the bandwidth restricts sending the encryption table which may be of 
significant size.   
It is important to note that the primary purpose of this approach is to allow secure 
computation on remote applications.  Figure 11 illustrates how intent protection by partial 
client-server is distinct from the classical client-server model.  The classical client-server 
model achieves function protection by removing all sensitive calculations from the 
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remote application and running them only within a trusted environment that in turn places 
the burden of computation completely on the server side. 
We can either directly decrypt and use the output or send it back to the remote 
application as necessary.  However, if the output is passed directly back to an un-trusted 
user, an adversary could again have access to the original black-box information that was 
intent protected.  In cases where the output needs to be used directly by the un-trusted 
user, the protected function must also be represented by a composition where h(x) = 
f(g(x)).  We gain the most benefit if the computation for g is much greater than f because 
g is the portion of the function distributed as seen in Figure 12.  In this configuration, the 
adversary has the output of the original function but does not have the full white-box 
structure of h with just (g o E).   
 
Figure 11.  Classical Client-server (top) and Partial Client-server (bottom) 
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Figure 12.  Output Recovery for h(xm) = f(g(xm))= yp 
Implementation by partial client-server incurs bandwidth requirements that may 
become a bottleneck.  However, this deployment does illustrate how it is potentially 
possible to securely offload intensive process to the remote applications.  To eliminate 
the bandwidth bottleneck, it is possible to use two functional compositions in conjunction 
to produce a watermark that identifies the author of the function.  This method also 
requires that the protected function is divisible into a function composition.  However, 
because the malicious hose performs the entire computational load, the computational 
complexity differences between g and f are not significant factors in contrast to the partial 
client-server implementation.  Figure 13 illustrates how atomic and individually useless 
functional tables can be used to secure a function, f(g(x)), and produce a unique 
watermark through symmetric keys.   
 
Figure 13.  Watermarking the Composite Function yp=f(g(xm)) with Watermark yn 
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In this configuration, functions f, g, Ek, and Dk, are secure through functional 
composition and generates the desired output without needing to contact a trusted source.  
Atomic properties of function composition protect the embedded keys in Ek, and Dk.  The 
watermark at yn, is a reproducible set of pseudorandom sequences generated with E and k. 
Even though it is observable by the adversary, the xm/yn and yn/yp input/output pairs do 
not reveal structural information about the individual functions f and g.  Thus, even if the 
adversary knew that AES was the encryption algorithm used, he is forced to enumerate 
2128 function tables for each key.  It would be statistically improbable, given the 
empirically random pattern, for the adversary to find another function that generates the 
exact same pattern of randomness despite knowing that a theoretical infinite number of 
functions produce the same function table.   
Software watermarking, like obfuscation, is a new research subject.  Thomborson 
defines three aspects of a watermarking system.  First, there must be an embedder to 
embed the watermark into the program.  Second, an extractor must be available to extract 
the watermark from the program.  Finally, an attack set must be constructed to understand 
ways an attack can modify the watermarked program; an attack set is the set of all attacks 
where the attacker can disable the extractor from removing the watermark (Thomborson, 
2007).   
For CFTs, the embedder and extractor is the E, D pair which is easily composed 
or removed from the protected function.  The attack set is more difficult to model because 
various ways exist for the adversary can attack this scheme.  Adding or deleting entries 
from the CFTs would not effectively destroy the watermark because the watermarking set 
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of sequences would still exist in the maliciously modified program.  Composing another 
function before the encryption CFT or after the decryption CFT would yield the 
adversary an altered program that retains the watermark of the original.  Composing 
tables after the encryption CFT or before the decryption CFT would break the 
watermarking sequence, but most likely break the functionality as well because the 
adversary does not know f and g.   
It would be statistically improbable, due to the empirical randomness generated 
by the cryptographic algorithm, for the adversary to effectively tamper with the logic by 
replacing just one of the functional tables.  However, since this research works with 
programs and functions of enumerate-able size, it is possible to replace the entire 
structure of the two CFTS with a single LUT thereby removing all structural and 
intermediary white-box information which includes the watermark. 
An alternative to the function table is its representation as a set of Boolean 
equations.  Boolean equations sets (BES) are also two dimensional representation of 
input and output that reveals no structural information.  For small input ranges, it may 
also be feasible to logically reduce the CFT into a BES by using the Quine-McCluskey or 
Espresso algorithms.  By providing only the minimized equations, we force the adversary 
to conduct an n input-sized black-box attack to recover the functional table.  However, a 
black-box attack is only O(2n) complexity where Quine-McCluskey is O(3n/n) meaning 
the issuer does significantly more work compared to the amount of work required to undo 
the protective measure (―Quine,‖ 2007).  Though computationally costly for the issuer, 
BES configurations remain an option when constructing two dimensional structures for a 
 
48 
function.  Table 4 illustrates a pseudo-coded Java method represented as an equivalent 
functional table and BES.   
Table 4.  Pseudo-code for a Conventional and Unprotected Deterministic Function 
public genericFunc(int a) { 
    …. 
    int result = operations with a 
    return result; 
} 
 
public genericFunc (int a) { 
     return lookupTable(a); 
} 
lookupTable = [# # # … #] 
public genericFunc(int a) { 
   result[0] = (a[1] & a[2] ) …      
   result[1] = (a[0] & a[3])… 
    … 
    return result; 
} 
In the implementation where we deploy an encryption and decryption CFT 
accessible to the adversary, using BES representations of each would require the 
adversary to perform two black-box attacks which measurably delays the adversary‘s 
ability to destroy the watermark by replacing the encryption and decryption BES with 
one LUT.  The logic minimization problem is NP-hard, but this limitation should not be 
prohibitive because we intend this approach for functions with small or bounded inputs 
(―Quine,‖ 2007). 
3.7 Developing an Implementation  
Generating function tables from an atomic function requires an enumeration of 
the desired range of inputs to obtain the I/O pair.  This is an exponential process, but only 
needs to be done once and done on high-end machines operating in trusted environments. 
Because the function tables are direct lookups, we can optimize performance for 
the specific environment such as mobile applications that may have limited processing 
power.  Applications commonly used function tables for mathematical functions such as 
sine or co-sine when computational capabilities to calculate floating point operations 
were unavailable (―Lookup,‖ 2007).  However, the trade-off comes in storage; the size of 
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the function table is (2n *m / 8) bytes of memory where n is the number of inputs and m is 
the output size in bits.  For even 24-bit inputs, full enumeration and storage would require 
268 MB.  If an AES encryption is used, any table encapsulating just 21-bits of input 
would require approximately 4 GB since each output is 128-bits.  Exponential memory 
requirements is a factor to consider if the end application using function tables must be 
deployed via networks with limited bandwidth. 
One benefits of using LUT as an implementation is the understandability of its 
structure.  As long as we populate the table with the correct values, table look ups are 
very low in complexity according to the software engineering metrics in Table 2.  Thus, 
by using software engineering metrics, the CFT approach rates very low in security when 
an attack is theoretically n-factorial in computational complexity.  A measurably secure 
approach that is low in software complexity is desirable because an issuer can focus on 
maintaining the complete program rather than the producing errors when adding in the 
obfuscation mechanism. 
3.8 Approach 
 We first examine the black-box characteristics of random programs.  We emulate 
random programs by generating combinational circuits with random structure following 
the example set forth by the IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems 85 
(ISCAS-85) benchmark suite.  The circuits in ISCAS-85 deliberately provide 
confidentiality and abstraction of high-level structural design or random circuit logic 
(Hansen and others, 1999:72).  We use combinational circuits as an abstraction of 
random programs because they are deterministic in nature and provide visually 
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understandable intermediate structural information.  Structural randomness is achieved by 
using a seeded random number generator that selects two random node points within the 
circuit and connects them using a randomly selected two-input gate.  We use six gates, 
known as the circuit‘s basis, to construct our random circuits: AND, OR, XOR, NAND, 
NOR, and NXOR, each with different I/O characteristics.  It is possible to specify the 
number of input bits and the number of output bits in the random program generator 
(RPG) so we can compare the I/O characteristics to non-random programs of equal size.   
Analysis of the black-box characteristics are selected metrics from the NIST suite 
of metrics to evaluate pseudo-random number generators.  We examine each bit of the 
output as a random string output.  The rationale behind this decision is that if it is 
possible to correctly guess every output bit, then it is possible to correctly guess the 
output.  We selected metrics that did not require minimum bit string lengths.  Because the 
output sequence affects some metrics and the output sequence is directly dependent on 
the input pattern sequence, we use two input different sequences for each set of input.  
First, we used a standard binary counter in big-endian order.  We then converted this 
pattern into gray-code as a second input pattern so we could observe the avalanche or 
diffusion effect of a single input bit. 
This research then examines the applicability, efficiency and security of CFT as a 
software-only software protection method.  First, we explore the applicability by 
replacing Java methods with function table implementations.  Efficiency is a qualitative 
measurement of the performance of the replacement and the memory space ratio 
compared to the original.  Finally, security is quantitatively measured by evaluating the 
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randomness of the output in the obfuscated version compared the un-obfuscated version.  
In addition, we compare decompiled functions of the original program against 
decompiled functions of the obfuscated versions using three open-sourced Java 
decompilers in a qualitative analysis of security. 
 Our hypothesis is that random programs generate random output.  Therefore, the 
intent protection model is necessary because structural randomness is insufficient.  
Furthermore, CFTs using symmetric key encryption tables can be effective at white-
boxing and black-boxing bounded input-size functions.  Each implementation, however, 
will be computationally expensive to generate because full enumeration of the function 
input space is necessary.  A mitigating factor is that we only need to compute encryption 
function tables once and we can reuse the encryption tables to protect different functions. 
3.9 System Boundaries  
 Since the goal of this research is to examine obfuscation under the intent 
protection model, the obvious system boundary consists of the components needed to 
create and evaluate obfuscated functions.  This system, the Encrypted Program 
Generation Engine (EPGE) has two parts because intent protection models obfuscation as 
two parts, white-box protection and black-box protection.   
 The first part of system generates random circuits to emulate random program 
structure using the aforementioned six gate circuit basis.  We verify uniqueness of the 
generated programs using a CRC32 hash.  For clarification, we consider symmetrical 
circuits unique using this method.  For example, an AND gate connecting node one and 
node two is considered distinct from an AND gate connecting node two and node one 
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even though they would generate the same results.  This was a design decision made so 
that uniqueness of a circuit could be quickly determined using the hash checker.  For this 
research, the RPG used is currently implemented in C++ which generates BENCH circuit 
files that are then interpreted and translated into a Java object for analysis by the EPGE.  
The EPGE then runs a black-box attack using the binary counter sequence and the gray-
coded binary counter sequence.  Results from the two operations are analyzed using 
seven statistical measures adapted from the NIST pseudo-random number generator test.  
We then perform the same set of analysis on any deterministic function of bounded input 
size implemented within the EPGE to obtain black-box characteristics of the function. 
 The second part of the system constructs CFT obfuscated versions of functions 
implemented within the EPGE.  Ideally, the EPGE should be able to read a Java class file 
that contains the high-level source code of a deterministic function and build a 
corresponding CFT version in high-level source for replacement in the original.  Due to 
time constraints for this research however, a deterministic function must be built within 
the EPGE package.  Since the goal in this part is to quantitatively examine function 
algorithms through a Java decompiler, manually importing algorithms in the EPGE 
should still adequately provide the observable results for white-box security comparison.  
For encryption, we use an open-sourced implementation of the AES algorithm and verify 
its functionality using the KeySBox Know Answer Test Values (Bassham, 2002).  In 
addition, the EPGE is capable of generating BES equivalent of a function table using the 
Quine-McCluskey algorithm.  We select the Quine-McCluskey algorithm because we 
know the algorithm‘s complexity (―Quine,‖ 2007).  While we do not use it directly as a 
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security mechanism, it is a component can be used to generate an obfuscation 
implementation. 
 Thus, the main component under test is the EPGE since it is the component that 
generates the random programs, generates CFT obfuscated programs, and performs 
black-box and white-box analysis.  Additional component consists of the Java compiler, 
the Java virtual machine, and hardware, such as the CPU and memory running the virtual 
machine. 
 We note that the source code of the pre-obfuscated function is an input to the 
EPGE and therefore not considered as part of the system under test (SUT).  The EPGE 
could obfuscate a function‘s function table if it was available which means that the source 
of the function does not influence design of the engine.  We illustrate the complete SUT 
in Figure 14.   
 
Figure 14. System Under Test 
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The main block contains the EPGE, the Java compiler and JVM, and the hardware 
components.  We show the changing factors and workloads as inputs on the left while the 
outputs are the metrics for the SUT which appear on the right of the main SUT block. 
3.9.1 System Services 
The EPGE takes a source-level function and generates a set of random programs 
with equal input/output size.  We perform statistical analysis on the output of the original 
function and the output of the random program set.  We list in Table 5 the possible 
outcomes. 
Table 5.  Possible Outcomes for System Services 
Result Random Program Set Original Function 
1 Statistically random output bits Statistically random output bits 
2 Statistically random output bits Statistically non-random output bits 
3 Statistically non-random output bits Statistically random output bits 
4 Statistically non-random output bits Statistically non-random output bits 
 
We select an AES key and compose it with the output of the original function to 
produce a CFT.  We then perform statistical analysis on the CFT. 
3.10 Workload and Factors 
 As stated in the problem definition, a benchmark suite of programs does not yet 
exist for software obfuscation.  Previous and concurrent work performed by the Program 
Encryption Group (PEG) uses the ISCAS-85 circuit library in BENCH format.  For 
continuity and compatibility with ongoing experiments, this research includes a function 
that reads in a bench circuit file and reproduces its input and output pattern.  It also works 
in tandem with the RPG to construct random structure in BENCH format using two-input 
gates. 
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Because most ISACAS 85 circuits are too large to enumerate within the resources 
available to this research, additional benchmark programs of deterministic functions are 
proposed.  Simple equations, such as y = a * b + c, trigonometric functions, such as y = 
cos(x), and the Fibonacci sequence are considered because they can be bounded in input-
size and were used in related research works focused on confidentiality of execution 
(Christiansen and others, 2006:2; Torri and others, 2007; ―Lookup,‖ 2007).  Table 6 
summarizes the workload factors as well as the reason for their selection as benchmark 
functions. 
Table 6.  Benchmark Functions 
Program  Reason for selection as benchmarks  
y = a * b + c  •  integer computation 
•  simple arithmetic 
•  divisible into f1 and f2 
y = cos(x)  •  periodic output pattern 
•  floating point arithmetic 
•  historically represented as table lookups 
•  often used in digital processing algorithms  
Fibonacci  •  recursive or iterative function 
•  expands quickly  
ISCAS 85 circuits  • hardware analogy 
3.11 Metrics 
 3.11.1 Black-box Metrics. 
Black-box metrics were adapted from a NIST test suite for pseudo-random 
number generators.  For clarification, we consider each output bit as a generator of a bit 
string and use statistical analysis to determine if patterns exist for each bit enabling the 
adversary to guess subsequent bits within the bit string.   
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We list in Table 7 the statistical tests used in this research and a summarized 
explanation for each test (―National Institute,‖ 2007).  We recognize there are existing 
test suites such as JDieHard, NESSIE, and the one provided by the NIST; however, these 
suites were designed for random program generators and some tests required minimum 
bit string lengths of 10,000 bits or greater.  Thus, we had to selectively implement tests 
that could provide results on much smaller bit string lengths due to our experimental 
benchmarks that have a relatively smaller input space. 
Table 7.  Statistical Test to Analyze Function Output 
Test Explanation 
Frequency (Sequence) Ratio of 1‘s to 0‘s produced in an output bit 
Frequency (Output) Ratio of 1‘s to 0‘s produced by all output bits  
Longest runs of 1‘s Longest uninterrupted sequence of 1‘s 
Number of 1‘s runs Number of runs with uninterrupted sequence of 1‘s 
Maximum excursion  Greatest distance from zero achieved when each output resulting 
in 0 or 1 is mapped to -1 and 1 respectively and the output‘s bit 
string is summed. 
Excursion states Size of the set of distances from zero achieved when each output 
resulting in 0 or 1 is mapped to -1 and 1 respectively and the 
output‘s bit string is summed. 
Zero excursion cycles Number of zero excursion cycles.  A cycle the summation of the 
outputs to an m-th bit and back to the origin when each output 
bit resulting in 0 or 1 is mapped to -1 and 1 respectively; m is 
increased incrementally until it reaches the end of the bit string.  
Approximate entropy Percentage of output bits flipped when a single input bit is 
flipped; used when gray-code input is used. 
 
3.11.2 White-box Metrics. 
 Metrics to evaluate the randomness of a structure is the subject on concurrent 
research within the PEG research group.  Because the proposed approach removes the 
program structure by converting a function into a two dimensional representation, this 
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research can subjectively examine the structural obfuscation of using CFT using various 
Java decompilers.  We derive quantitative security measures from the steps that an 
adversary needs to perform to break apart the CFT along with the computational 
complexity associated with each step, as stated in section 3.5; the theoretical maximum 
security according to computational complexity is directly correlated to input size. 
 3.11.3 Side-channel Metrics.    
 Performance and memory costs are important because they determine the 
practicality of the obfuscation.  We measure performance as execution time in seconds 
and measure cost in terms of memory size in bits.  These metrics are common, non-
subjective, and understandable within the computer science.  Because cost of the CFT 
implementation is very different from the time it takes to generate a CFT 
implementation, a developer must decide whether generation costs should factor into the 
cost of obfuscation.  For consistency, we only consider the memory cost of the deployed 
obfuscation and the performance running the obfuscated function when evaluating an 
obfuscated program.  We note that multiple obfuscations of different functions will cost 
less to generate because the paired encryption table only needs to be generated once. 
Thus, future obfuscations of functions with the same bounded input-size incur 
incrementally less generation costs because we can pair it with any pre-enumerated 
encryption table.   
We compare the above metrics against the four properties of an obfuscation 
proposed by Collberg and others‘ work summarized in Table 8 (Collberg and others, 
2004:738).   
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Table 8.  Summary of Collberg and Others’ Obfuscation Properties 
Properties Explanation 
Potency Difficulty in understanding the obfuscated code 
Resilience Difficulty in automating a tool to de-obfuscate obfuscated code 
Cost Penalty in execution time/memory space incurred by obfuscated code 
Stealth Statistical similarity of obfuscated code compared to pre-obfuscated code 
Quality = (Potency, Resilience, Cost, Stealth) 
 
In using CFT, potency and resilience should be a direct correlation to the time 
required for an adversary to conduct a brute-force attack on the function table of n-size 
input disassociating security metrics from cognitive ability.  We do not emphasize stealth 
in our approach because security should not be dependent on obscurity (―Kerckhoff‘s 
principle,‖ 2007), even in the watermarking configuration.  We postulate that CFT‘s 
stealth is directly related to the number of lookup operations that are done within non-
sensitive portions of the code because CFT operations are lookup operations; the lookup 
operations may be file accesses or array searches depending on the final implementation 
of the CFT. 
3.12 Parameters  
 Because the EPGE provides metrics for the CFT obfuscated function in relation to 
the original function, the hardware that executes both functions must remain constant 
across all experiments.  The experimental system is an Intel M 1.73 GHz processor, with 
1.5 gigabytes of RAM running Windows XP Tablet Edition.  The operating system is 
important because it is not possible to control task scheduling which affects performance 
metrics; thus, we repeat experiments and average results to minimize the variability 
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caused by the operating system.  We use the Java 5.0 compiler; this is also important 
because we perform analysis on the bytecode code produced by the compiler.    
3.13 Evaluation Technique 
 We divide security achieved through CFT into white-box and black-box security.  
CFT obfuscated functions are decompiled with Jadeclipse, JDec, and JODE to compare 
the original function against the obfuscated function.  This step provides a subjective 
measure of white-box security or how well CFT ―confuses‖ someone using standard 
packages of these readily available open source tools.  We select three open source Java 
decompliers; though their main function is decompilation, each has distinguishing 
features.  Jadeclipse1 is available as a packaged plug-in for the Eclipse Java development 
environment.  JODE2 is available both as an applet and console application.  JDec3 has an 
easy-to-use graphical user interface.  The first and most notable Java decompiler, 
Mocha4, was not used because it has not been updated to decompile recent changes in 
Java class files. 
We assess black-box security by the same statistical random measures used in 
evaluating the output of random programs.  It is difficult to otherwise evaluate security 
efficacy other than this manner because CFT abstracts all other implementation detail 
specifically to force the adversary to do computationally expensive brute-force attacks.  
Using a ―red-team‖ of skilled reverse-engineers would provide much better evaluation of 
                                                 
1 http://jadclipse.sourceforge.net/ 
2 http://jode.sourceforge.net/ 
3 http://jdec.sourceforge.net/ 
4 http://www.brouhaha.com/~eric/software/mocha/ 
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the CFT approach; this evaluation approach is unfeasible due to the limited time and 
resources available for this research. 
We use direct measurement of execution time because it is the most 
understandable metric for computer programs; we collect this measurement using the 
Eclipse Test and Performance Tool Platform (TPTP) profiling tool5.  Finer 
measurements, such as calculating instructions per clock cycle, are difficult due to non-
standard processor instruction sets, pipelining, caching and operating system tasking 
order.  In addition, computer scientists and cryptographers generally use theoretical 
complexity metrics to describe algorithms in a hardware platform independent notation. 
File size is also a well understood metric and we use the standard file explorer on 
the Microsoft Windows XP installed on a NTFS file-system partition. 
3.14 Experimental Design 
 The EPGE performs the experimental design on the benchmark programs.  In the 
steps outlined in the approach section, we compare the output of the original function the 
RPG set of functions with equal input/output size for black-box analysis.  Since most of 
the benchmark functions are not actually BENCH circuits, we used a constant 
intermediate size as a parameter in the RPG.  For each random program set, we generate 
1,000 unique circuits to provide output for comparison by statistical analysis.  We then 
perform statistical analysis on AES ciphers with 1000 different keys to verify the effect 
of encryption on functional output bits. 
                                                 
5 http://www.eclipse.org/tptp/ 
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 3.15 Chapter Summary 
This research examines intent protection as an alternate obfuscation model to 
VBB deemed ideal but impractical for practical obfuscators.  Intent protection makes a 
clear distinction between a program‘s white-box structure and black-box functionality; 
this makes it possible to evaluate these two facets of a program separately.  Using 
pseudo-random number generators and encryption as an analogy to obfuscation, this 
research applies security metrics independent of human cognitive ability.  We propose 
function tables and compositions of function tables with symmetric key encryption tables 
as an obfuscation approach to completely mask white-box structure.  Encryption 
algorithms provide resistance to linear and differential analysis on the output of the 
function.  We keep the hardware, operating system, and compliers constant in the SUT to 
reduce variability in factors generating the metrics.  After collecting the metrics, we can 
use the data to justify further development of this approach.  This chapter presents an 
alternate model for evaluating obfuscation, the creation of the CFT implementation, the 
security principles for its design, and the experiments to examine CFT as a software-only 
software protection technique.  
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IV. Analysis and Results 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter discusses the results of the experiments described in Chapter III.  We 
use statistical data analysis to measure the output generated by randomly generated bench 
circuit functions, benchmark functions, and functions composed with an AES encryption.  
Additionally, we use three open-sourced Java decompilers to observe the effect of CFTs 
on the Java class files from compiled benchmark functions.  Our observations 
qualitatively measure the CFT‘s protection strength and propose improvements to this 
approach. 
4.2 Results of Experimental Benchmark Programs 
4.2.1 Quantitative Analysis of Black-box Data. 
 We analyze the sets of 1,000 randomly generated BENCH circuits with the 
statistical tests listed in Table 7.  We use the input/output sizes of the benchmark 
programs listed in Table 6 as parameters for the RPG.  Because the impact of the internal 
structure is currently unknown, we set the parameter for the number of intermediate 
nodes to 100, 300 and 500.  For the circuit c17, we generated an additional random 
program set with six intermediate nodes to match the original circuit description. 
 First, we conduct an analysis on the collective random function output.  Each 
function produces an output signature which is the output sequence of the function based 
on an input sequence.  The total possible number of unique signatures is  (2𝑜𝑢𝑡 )(2𝑖𝑛 ) 
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where out is the number of output bits and in is the number of input bits.  We check the 
output signatures of the random function sets for uniqueness using a CRC32 checksum.   
 Numbers within sets of identical output signature are an indicator of functional 
equivalency and structural diversity.  For a set of randomly generated programs to 
produce large sets of non-unique output signatures, it may be a signature that exhibits 
weak correlation between structural pattern and output signature.  If we intend to 
obfuscation white-box information by emulating randomly constructed circuits, then 
signatures with a large number of candidate structures are good candidates for 
obfuscation.  In practical terms, it means that we can swap the structure of one member 
within the set with another member in the same set.  This obfuscates the original structure 
because we produced the alternate structural logic randomly without any knowledge of 
the original structure and therefore the replacement structure cannot leak information 
about the original structure. 
 Random function sets of 5-2-6 and 5-2-100 yielded 125 and 71 functions that 
produced non-unique output signatures respectively presented in Table 9.  The other 
random function sets did not produce any duplicate output signatures. 
Table 9.  Non-unique Output Signature Characteristics of 1000 Random Functions 
5-2-6 5-2-100 
Set size of identical 
output signatures 
Number of 
Sets 
Set size of identical 
output signatures 
Number of 
Sets 
2 32 2 7 
3 2 11 1 
4 8 12 1 
5 1 16 1 
9 2 18 1 
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 We expected fully unique signatures for even the small input and output 
parameters because 432 unique signatures are possible.  For a set of 1,000 random 
functions to exhibit signature collisions may indicate that structural diversity is great for 
smaller input/output parameters.  We observe that the intermediate node is a factor in 
producing signature collisions.  Increasing intermediate node size causes a drop in 
collision frequency but an increase in collision concentration where the chance of 
collision is less likely, but in the case of collision, the collision set tends to be greater in 
size.  We graph our observations regarding intermediate node size and signature 
collisions in Therefore, obfuscation of a complete white-box structure may be more 
effective with partial obfuscations of smaller input/output size with a large intermediate 
node size so there are several candidates for replacement.   
 
Figure 15.  Signature Collisions in 5-2-X 
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Figure 16.  Signature Collision to Intermediate Node Size 
We then perform analysis on each individual benchmark program and 
corresponding function set.  For clarity, we display only the gray code input sequence in 
the following tables.  It is important to note that metrics on run lengths and excursion 
states are dependent on input sequence.  In addition, using gray code input provides the 
avalanche metric for comparison between the benchmark output and random function 
output.  We recognize that there are many there are many possible sequences that exist 
where we flip only one input bit.  We use the gray code as an exploratory technique to 
observe the avalanche affect of input bits; the avalanche effect on output bits for 
cryptographic ciphers should be observable using gray code input.  We verify by using a 
black-box analysis of the output from 1,000 AES encryption output tables using a gray 
code input sequence.  Tables illustrating the results of the statistical analysis comparing 
benchmark and respective input/output size random functions are found in the Appendix; 
the result of each test by output bit is provided so that the distinction between benchmark 
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and random functions can be visualized.  We use averaging across the 1,000 random 
functions on each output bit to provide a result.  The experiments provide a picture of the 
expected values of the seven statistical tests for a randomly generated program of a 
certain input/output size.  From the results of this experiment, it appears that random 
functions generate consistent results for each output bit across all tests which can be 
contrasted against the output bit behavior in the benchmark functions.   
In Figure 17, Figure 18, and Figure 19, we graph the standard deviation for all bits 
in the output by test for some of the benchmark functions and their respective random 
program set.  For these graphs, we included the binary counter sequence.  We observe 
disparity in results; random program sets produce significantly less diversity in their 
output bits than the benchmarks as shown by the flat lines generated by the random 
program sets in the three figures.  We note that our two input sequences produced similar 
results. 
Within this limited set of benchmarks, it appears that the number of excursion 
states is the biggest indicator of an unprotected benchmark function versus the set of 
random functions while the number of zero cycles tends to be a poor indicator.  In 
addition, this black-box analysis on deviation from expected randomness values lets us 
know which statistical test best isolates non-random behaving bits in the output.  We can 
then target the control flow of the bits that do not exhibit random behavior with structural 
randomness.  This information is useful in cases where we cannot use black-box 
protection and the security must rely only on white-box structural entropy. 
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Figure 17.  Standard Deviations of All C17 Output Bits by Metric 
 
 
Figure 18.  Standard Deviations of All y = a * b + c Output Bits by Metric 
 
 
Figure 19.  Standard Deviations of All Fibonacci Output Bits by Metric 
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We conducted a statistical analysis of AES encryption with 1,000 keys and equal 
input size of five bits to examine the feasibility of protecting a c17 circuit from the 
ISCAS-85 circuit library with AES.  The standard deviations between AES and the 
random program set for each metric, shown in Figure 20.  Standard Deviations of All 
AES Output Bits by Metric was significantly closer to zero than any other experimental 
function.   
 
Figure 20.  Standard Deviations of All AES Output Bits by Metric 
The averages and standard deviations can also be found in Table 10; per bit 
graphs are not included because it is difficult to clearly represent all 128-bits graphically.  
We note that we adjusted the random program set parameter from 100 and 300 to 500 and 
1000 in order to accommodate the significantly larger output size in AES.  Different 
results between the AES and random program set produce approximately the same 
results.  The metrics provided by these random sets are valuable because the results for 
these metrics are unknown for random program structure.  Thus, these metrics provide a 
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comparison point for functions that may have the parameters such as input size, output 
size, or intermediary node size. 
Table 10.  Statistical Results of AES and a Random Program Set 
Function % of 
1's 
Longest 1's 
Runs 
Excur. from 
Zero 
Zero 
Cycles 
Excur. 
States 
Runs of 
1's 
AES avg 0.50 4.00 6.62 0.69 8.96 8.25 
AES std dev 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.08 
5-128-500 avg 0.50 8.05 18.34 1.23 19.51 4.55 
5-128-500 std dev 0.01 0.35 0.32 0.09 0.29 0.09 
5-128-1000 avg 0.50 7.95 18.35 1.12 19.51 4.60 
5-128-1000 std dev 0.01 0.30 0.29 0.09 0.26 0.09 
 
We note that the metrics did not change significantly between the 500 and 1000 
internal node set or random functions indicating that intermediate node size may not be a 
significant factor on the randomness of individual output bits.  This was also true for the 
benchmark programs even though we did produce a small percentage of signature 
collisions in the 5-2-X set of experiments.  Standard deviations also remained small 
though we note that the standard deviations of the two random set in our 5-2-X with AES 
experiments mirrored each other which could indicate that our RPG construction is a 
factor.  No functions within the two 5-128-X sets shared the same output signature.   
In addition, the test verified that the 1,000 AES keys produced 50% approximate 
entropy on the output as expected when we use gray code input.  We note that the 
unprotected benchmark functions on average produce only 26% approximate entropy.  
This means that a change in a single input bit has significantly less impact, or more 
specifically, less of an avalanche effect on the output bits of randomly generated circuits.  
Therefore, our results indicate that structural entropy alone does not, on average, produce 
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the same black-box entropy as cryptographic functions.  We are interested in the 
approximate entropy results specifically because the greater entropy tends to hinder 
black-box analysis.  We graph our results in Figure 21.  The first column is our 
verification of approximate entropy on AES, followed by the approximate entropy 
observed in our randomly generated sets.  We obtained the fourth column results by using 
an AES encryption table to protect the output of the c17 circuit.  This did not increase 
approximate entropy because ECB does not hide output patterns.  We achieved 
approximate entropy results similar to AES when we applied two different padding 
schemes to diffuse the output space prior to applying the AES encryption, as shown in the 
last two columns. 
 
Figure 21.  Approximate Entropy of AES and 5-128-X 
4.2.2 Qualitative Analysis of White-box Data. 
 None of the Java decompilers had any difficulty creating source code from 
unprotected and CFT protected code.  We expected this because CFT was a technique 
used to remove the structural information rather breaking the tools‘ decompilation 
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process.  The common denominator between the original source and the results provided 
by all the decompilers is the removal of comments.  Figure 22 shows the original 
unobfuscated Java source code for one of the benchmark functions for contrast with 
Figure 23.  JODE and JDEC provided the same results.  Figure 24 is the decompiled 
source by Jadclipse on a CFT implemented c17 benchmark function.  The CFT code is 
simple in software engineering complexity and the function becomes a file access in this 
particular implementation. 
 
Figure 22.  Original Source Code of y = a * b + c 
 
 
Figure 23.  Decompiled Source Code by Jadclipse 
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Figure 24.  Decompiled Source Code of CFT implementation 
 4.2.3 Analysis of Side-Channel Data. 
 CFT is not fixed to an implementation because the security concept is to prevent 
adversary analysis by flattening of functional structure to two-dimensions.  Because this 
research implemented the CFT using text files, the protected programs took longer to run 
due to frequent file accesses; the disk accesses incurred cost penalty in performance time 
because disk access operations are slower than the operations in the benchmark programs 
which did not require significant processing power. 
 In complexity terms, a lookup operation in the encryption table is constant time, 
O(1) making CFT very scalable.  Constant time is achievable because every entry is the 
same size and we can provide the entries, input order sorted, so that an index search is 
possible.  We can use the original cryptographic primitive to decrypt and recover the 
output and we know that the cryptographic primitive runs in polynomial time.  If we use 
the function table for decryption, we could first apply sorting to the output table and then 
use a binary search to achieve O(nlogn) performance.  We cannot use the same indexing 
method as the encryption table because the ciphertexts sparsely populate too large a 
range.   
 We found the file sizes consistent to our estimates of 2n * m bits where n is the 
number of input bits and m is the number of output bits.  We note that a side effect in our 
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implementation under the NTFS file system test environment is that Windows file 
explorer reports a difference between the actual file size and the size the file takes on the 
disk.   
 For BES representations of CFTs, we found early in our experiments that storing 
the BES as a file take much more memory space than the CFT in our implementation.  
For a BES, we cannot estimate the length or the number of prime implicate for each 
output bit.  However, we are attempting to achieve random output so we expect each 
output bit to produce significantly long Boolean equations making textual representation 
very inefficient.  We do not propose BES implementation as a text file; we generate it as 
a blueprint for a minimized sum-of-products two-dimensional gate structure that can be 
then implemented as code.  We implement BES textually mainly to examine this 
structure generation for future experimentation.  In terms of performance, BES runs with 
complexity O(n) where n is the number of output bits because each output bit has its own 
Boolean equation that runs in constant time. 
4.3 Summary 
 The research shows that random programs can be a comparison tool for intent 
protected obfuscation techniques such as CFT.  While there is yet to be a set of agreed 
upon metrics to compare program structure, there are metrics in use that analyzes 
function output.  The results shown in this chapter show that programs with randomly 
generated structure produce randomness across the output bits.  The randomness closely 
equals that of AES, a strong encryption algorithm.  In the same way that functional 
randomness produces output that is hard to discern a pattern, structural randomness may 
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produce program structure that is difficult to analyze.  Thus, if it becomes possible to 
accurately assess structural randomness, it will be possible for an obfuscation to be intent 
protected by creating an obfuscated version of a function that is both structurally random 
and functionally random.  In the absence of such metrics, this research uses CFT with 
symmetric encryption to remove the structural details of a program while creating 
measurably random output as an obfuscation technique.  
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter reviews the main research goals outlined in Chapter I with the 
corresponding findings of this research.  For each goal, we briefly summarize the relevant 
results and conclusions.  We propose recommendations for future research and 
enhancements as well. 
5.2 Research Goals 
 5.2.1 Describe an Alternate Model for Software Obfuscation. 
 This research describes an alternate model for obfuscation and its possible 
applicability.  Its authors and the theoretical obfuscation community, in general, accept 
the original VBB model, to be a non-pragmatic model for building obfuscation tools.  
The intent protection model proposes removal of the function preservation property as a 
modification to the VBB model.  This research investigates the problem where black-box 
information may provide reverse engineers information to reconstruct a protected 
function‘s white-box information suggesting that masking a function‘s input and output 
relationship is critical to protecting the function. 
 5.2.2 Describe an Implementable Obfuscation Algorithm. 
 Every deterministic function generates a function table which describes the 
function in a two-level representation that removes all white-box information.  We select 
the AES symmetric key cryptographic primitive to black-box protect deterministic 
functions due to their strength to key length ratio and understandability when operating in 
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ECB.  We provide motivation where the applicability of function tables are within the 
confines of bounded input size and deterministic algorithms. 
 5.2.3 Quantitatively Assess Obfuscation Quality with Non-cognition Metrics. 
 By dropping the function preserving property from the VBB model in the intent 
protection model, we can use cryptographic metrics, such various statistical analyses of 
function outputs, in lieu of cognition and psychology-based metrics.  Comparisons 
between original functions and randomized functions of the same characteristics show 
that the black-box information can leak information about the program without white-box 
analysis.  Random program set and output bits of the AES algorithm both  produce output 
bits that are statistically random; a CFT that composes the function with an AES function 
table can emulate similar output results in addition to removal of structural information 
thereby giving the adversary as limited information as possible for analysis.  CFT is also 
understandable and low in software engineering complexity. 
 5.2.4 Qualitatively Assess Obfuscation Quality with Reverse-engineering Tools. 
 The function table and composite function table approach is very effective against 
Java decompilers such as Jadclipse, JODE, and JDEC.  As expected, a table 
representation flattens the function into a LUT, leaking no white-box information other 
than the fact that we used an LUT in the software-only environment despite using an 
information laden bytecode language.  Function table also flattens the run time 
characteristics thereby reducing the side-channel information that may inadvertently leak 
details about white-box structure. 
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5.3 Conclusions of Research 
 Software obfuscation is a difficult problem and we concede that a single perfect 
solution to secure all programs does not exist.  An agreed upon set of metrics and 
benchmarks are needed to evaluate various proposed techniques in software protection 
research. 
 This research advocates the use of the intent protection model to evaluate 
software obfuscation in place of the idealistic VBB model.  Under intent protection, it is 
possible to use separate but established black-box metrics to accurately define security 
strength of obfuscation so that we can achieve practical obfuscation with provable 
security measures.  Applying symmetric cryptographic principles to obfuscation reduces 
the dependency on using software engineering metrics that were not intended for use as a 
security metric.  Using function tables is a technique that heavily favors security and 
performance over applicability in the obfuscation trade-off of applicability, efficiency, 
and security.  By converting all deterministic functions to a two-dimensional 
representation, we protect the white-box information from analysis.  We note that we do 
gain some applicability in that it is easier to determine a function‘s input/output size than 
it is to find if the function is part of a family that can be obfuscated in other theoretical 
models.  We also note that the CFT approach benefits developers, such as nation states, 
who can leverage their asymmetrically vaster computing resources to create protected 
functions of larger sizes or to break the protection under the CFT technique more quickly. 
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5.4 Significance of Research 
The limitation of the functional table approach is the treatment of all programs as 
deterministic functions and the severe bound on input sizes.  It is noted however, that this 
technique was intended to serve as a demonstration platform for the intent protection 
model and identify the tools to evaluate both black-box and white-box security for Java 
programs.  This research directly supports PEG‘s obfuscation research by first identifying 
the tools to evaluate output entropy and then designing the benchmarks programs for 
testing in the software domain.  Furthermore, this research has demonstrated metrics to 
functionally evaluate random programs which benefit concurrent PEG research in 
evaluating the structure of random programs. 
5.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
Our intent was to use functional tables as a software-only solution for a software 
problem.  It is foreseeable that this approach would be adaptable in the hardware domain 
due to the prevalence of FPGAs and their inherent LUT structure where it is possible to 
replicate an n input size combinational circuit with an n address-input memory (Valhid, 
2007:106).  In addition, because hardware can concurrently compute at the bit level, the 
same computation can be executed hundreds or thousands of times faster in comparison 
to a microprocessor.  However, it is noted that white-box information such as hardware 
characteristics not present in the software environment may be leaked through the 
functional table implementation and thus deserve further investigation.  
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5.6 Summary 
This research shows that intent protection model is a viable alternative to the 
VBB obfuscation model.  The proposed function table approach is a provably secure 
technique that we can evaluate with established cryptographic metrics.  It is also 
understandable in approach and implementation.  While the approach imposes 
restrictions on the applicability to certain programs, function tables serve as a foundation 
to bridge the theoretical obfuscation research and the practical obfuscators.  A complete 
obfuscation based on both output entropy and structural entropy may provide a multi-
tiered defense against reverse engineer targeting sensitive military software. 
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Appendix A: Black-box Analysis of c17 Against Random Functions 
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Appendix B: Black-box Analysis of y = a * b + c Against Random Functions 
 
 
 
bit7 bit6 bit5 bit4 bit3 bit2 bit1 bit0
y = a * b + c 0.14 0.29 0.38 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
12-8-100 (GC) 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.50
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
1
's
 p
e
r 
o
u
tp
u
t 
b
it
Frequency (Sequence)
bit7 bit6 bit5 bit4 bit3 bit2 bit1 bit0
y = a * b + c 120.00 146.00 112.00 40.00 16.00 8.00 4.00 2.00
12-8-100 (GC) 412.00 372.00 358.00 394.00 423.00 385.00 377.00 406.00
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
400.00
450.00
Le
n
gh
th
 o
f 
1
's
 s
e
q
u
e
n
ce
Longest Runs of 1's
 
85 
 
 
 
bit7 bit6 bit5 bit4 bit3 bit2 bit1 bit0
y = a * b + c 2914.00 1822.00 1008.00 400.00 8.00 4.00 2.00 1.00
12-8-100 (GC) 1934.30 2017.15 1916.16 1922.20 1984.88 1970.65 1954.32 1990.77
0.00
500.00
1000.00
1500.00
2000.00
2500.00
3000.00
3500.00
G
re
at
e
st
 d
is
ta
n
ce
 f
ro
m
 z
e
ro
Maximum Excursion
bit7 bit6 bit5 bit4 bit3 bit2 bit1 bit0
y = a * b + c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24.00 576.00 1024.00 2048.00
12-8-100 (GC) 99.25 81.72 91.12 86.94 60.65 73.37 79.70 81.89
0.00
500.00
1000.00
1500.00
2000.00
2500.00
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
cy
cl
e
s
Zero Excursion Cycles
 
86 
 
 
 
bit7 bit6 bit5 bit4 bit3 bit2 bit1 bit0
y = a * b + c 2914.00 1822.00 1008.00 400.00 17.00 9.00 5.00 3.00
12-8-100 (GC) 1959.92 2039.65 1940.46 1947.60 2007.24 1994.87 1976.48 2010.42
0.00
500.00
1000.00
1500.00
2000.00
2500.00
3000.00
3500.00
Ex
cu
rs
io
n
s 
st
at
e
s 
se
t 
si
ze
Excursion States
bit7 bit6 bit5 bit4 bit3 bit2 bit1 bit0
y = a * b + c 16.00 46.00 116.00 244.00 456.00 624.00 816.00 1056.00
12-8-100 (GC) 365.04 357.00 390.00 371.76 351.68 367.55 377.22 372.68
0.00
200.00
400.00
600.00
800.00
1000.00
1200.00
R
u
n
s
Number of 1's Runs
 
87 
 
 
 
 
 
% of 1's in output
y = a * b + c 0.41
12-8-100 (GC) 0.50
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
1
's
 in
 o
u
tp
u
t
Frequency (Output)
Approx. Entropy
y = a * b + c 0.21
12-8-100 (GC) 0.18
0.17
0.17
0.18
0.18
0.19
0.19
0.20
0.20
0.21
0.21
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
fl
ip
p
e
d
 o
u
tp
u
t 
b
it
s
Approximate Entropy
 
88 
Appendix C: Black-box Analysis of Fibonacci Against Random Functions 
 
 
 
bit11 bit10 bit9 bit8 bit7 bit6 bit5 bit4 bit3 bit2 bit1 bit0
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bit11 bit10 bit9 bit8 bit7 bit6 bit5 bit4 bit3 bit2 bit1 bit0
Fibonacci 16.0 16.0 14.0 14.0 12.0 9.00 9.00 9.00 6.00 9.00 6.00 4.00
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